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A New Lens: Reframing the
Conversation about the Use of Video
Conferencing in Civil Trials in Ontario
AMY SALYZYN *
The state of courtroom technology in Ontario is increasingly capturing the attention of both
the public and the legal profession. This article seeks to contribute to the conversation on
this issue by focusing on one particular technology in Ontario’s courtrooms: the use of
video conferencing to receive witness testimony in civil trials. The central claim is that
the approach to video conferencing that dominates the policy discourse reflects an overly
narrow, instrumentalist view of technology that fails to adequately take account of possible
broader political and social implications as well as this technology’s transformative potential.
This argument is developed by exploring two different sources of risk associated with the
implementation of video-conferencing technology in civil trials: (1) how video conferencing,
as a mediating technology, may unintentionally interfere with credibility assessments and
emotional connections between courtroom participants; and (2) the ways in which video
conferencing, by disrupting the physical geography of adjudication, threatens the solemnity
associated with, and respect given to, the civil justice system.
A detailed consideration of these risks reveals that video conferencing engages fundamental
questions about our civil justice system and implicates democratic values in ways that require
more nuanced consideration in conversations about its use. Rather than offer a final verdict
on the use of video conferencing in civil trials in Ontario, this article concludes by calling for
deeper and broader discourse on this issue. This discussion should include all stakeholders
in a conversation about if and how video-conferencing technology should be incorporated
into our civil justice system.
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L’état de la technologie dans les salles d’audience de l’Ontario retient de plus en plus
l’attention du public et des juristes. Cet article se penche sur cette question en mettant
l’accent sur une technologie particulière employée dans les salles d’audience ontariennes,
l’utilisation de la vidéoconférence pour entendre des témoignages lors de procès civils. Notre
argumentation prétend que l’approche envers la vidéoconférence qui a fini par dominer le
discours en matière de politiques considère de manière trop étroite et instrumentale la technologie et ne prend pas en compte de manière adéquate la possibilité de plus importantes
répercussions politiques et sociales, ni le potentiel de transformation inhérent à cette technologie. Nous examinons pour ce faire deux risques découlant de la mise en œuvre de la
technologie de la vidéoconférence lors de procès civils : 1) comment la vidéoconférence,
à titre de technologie d’appariement, peut interférer sans le vouloir avec l’évaluation de la
crédibilité et les liens émotifs des participants de la salle d’audience et 2) la manière dont
la vidéoconférence, en éparpillant géographiquement le processus de décision, perturbe la
solennité du système de justice civil et le respect qui lui est dû.
Un examen détaillé de ces risques révèle que la vidéoconférence soulève des questions fondamentales au sujet de notre système de justice civile et met en cause les valeurs
démocratiques d’une manière qui exige une réflexion plus nuancée lors des discussions
touchant son utilisation. Plutôt que d’offrir un verdict final sur l’utilisation de la vidéoconférence lors de procès civils en Ontario, cet article arrive à la conclusion que notre discours
sur cet enjeu devrait s’approfondir et s’élargir. Ce discours doit inclure tous les intervenants
dans une discussion pour savoir dans quelle mesure et de quelle manière il est souhaitable
d’incorporer la technologie de la vidéoconférence dans notre système de justice civile.
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We make our technologies, and they, in turn, shape us. So of every technology we must
ask, Does it serve our human purposes?—a question that causes us to reconsider what
these purposes are. Technologies, in every generation, present opportunities to reflect on
our values and direction.
- Sherry Turkle1
THE STATE OF COURTROOM TECHNOLOGY in Ontario is an issue that has captured

the attention of both the public and the legal profession. In 2011, a Canadian
Press article described the many ways that Ontario’s courts fail to adopt otherwise
widely used technologies and raised the provocative question, “[a]re Ontario’s
courts the place technology forgot?”2 A few weeks later, The Lawyers Weekly
published an article entitled “E-trials seen as ‘essential’ for justice in the future,”
reporting on a specialized courtroom in Toronto outfitted for “electronic trials”
and lamenting that “for all their promise, e-courtrooms have yet to reach a
tipping point.”3 Despite popular interest, however, there is little scholarly work in
Canada on the issue of courtroom technology. This article seeks to fill this gap by
focusing on one particular technology in Ontario’s courtrooms: the use of videoconferencing technology to receive witness testimony in civil trials.
For over a decade, the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure have allowed for
witnesses in civil trials to testify remotely using video-conferencing technology. To
date, however, judges have exercised caution and this technology has not become
a routine fixture in this province’s civil courts. As is later discussed, policy discourse
encouraging the use of new technologies in Ontario’s civil justice system suggests
that this should change. Video-conferencing technology, in particular, has been
increasingly characterized as a positive development, offering a cheaper, more
flexible way to receive evidence in court. Efficiency is the guiding norm, with
improved access to justice being the stated policy goal. From this perspective,
judicial resistance to more widespread use of video-conferencing technology
appears to be obstructing easily obtainable improvements to the civil justice
system.
In this article, I argue that the approach to video conferencing that has come
to dominate the policy discourse reflects an overly narrow, instrumentalist view
1.
2.

3.

Alone Together: Why We Expect More from Technology and Less from Each Other (New York:
Basic Books, 2011) at 19.
Allison Jones, “No Internet, no BlackBerrys. Are Ontario’s courts the place technology
forgot?” The Canadian Press (15 March 2011), online: <http://www.citynews.ca/2011/03/15/
no-internet-no-blackberrys-are-ontarios-courts-the-place-technology-forgot/>.
Luigi Benetton, “E-trials seen as ‘essential’ for justice in the future,” The Lawyers Weekly
(22 April 2011), online: <http://www.lawyersweekly.ca/index.php?section=article&article
id=1396>.
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of technology. I critique this approach as failing to take into account potential
unintended effects of video conferencing and broader social and political implications
of using this technology. I develop this argument by exploring two different
sources of risk: (1) how video conferencing, as a mediating technology, may
unintentionally interfere with credibility assessments and emotional connections
amongst courtroom participants; and (2) the ways in which video conferencing,
by disrupting the geography of adjudication, threatens the solemnity associated
with, and respect given to, the civil justice system. These risks, in my view, require
caution in introducing video-conferencing technology and a more nuanced,
collective conversation about its use that meaningfully engages with these risks
and with the transformative potential of this technology. Moreover, as I will
analyze in more detail, these risks engage fundamental questions about our
civil justice system and democratic values. As such, this reframed conversation
requires the attention not only of policy makers, but of all stakeholders.
This article proceeds in five parts. In Part I, I introduce Rule 1.08 of the
Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs the use of trial testimony
received through video conferencing. The cautious approach taken by Ontario
courts is revealed and contrasted with policy statements that encourage greater
use of technology in the province’s civil justice system. Part II introduces the
philosophical accounts of technology that guide my critique. Parts III and IV
examine the potential consequences of using video-conferencing technology
that are not accounted for in the dominant policy approach. In Part III, I
examine these effects from the perspective of video conferencing as a mediating
technology, while in Part IV I focus on the ways in which video conferencing
may disrupt the geography of adjudication. Finally, in Part V, I revisit the case for
caution in using video-conferencing technology, arguing that discourse regarding
the use of video-conferencing technology should be broadened and deepened so
that all stakeholders take part in a discussion of whether to further incorporate
video-conferencing technology into our civil justice system.

I. THE STATE OF PLAY: THE CURRENT TREATMENT OF
VIDEO-CONFERENCING TECHNOLOGY IN THE CASE LAW
AND IN POLICY
A. RULE 1.08 AND ITS JUDICIAL APPLICATION

First introduced in 1999, Rule 1.08 of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure
provides, inter alia, that a witness’s oral evidence at trial may be received by video
conference if the parties consent; and that in the absence of consent, evidence may
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be received by video conference upon motion or on the court’s own initiative.4
Even if the parties consent, the receipt of evidence through video conferencing is
not permitted as a matter of right, but is always subject to the discretion of the
court. In exercising its discretion, the court is required to take the following seven
factors into account:
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.
6.
7.
4.
5.

The general principle that evidence and argument should be presented
orally in open court;
The importance of the evidence to the determination of the issues in
the case;
The effect of the telephone or video conference on the court’s ability
to make findings, including determinations about the credibility of
witnesses;
The importance in the circumstances of the case of observing the
demeanour of a witness;
Whether a party, witness or lawyer for a party is unable to attend
because of infirmity, illness, or any other reason;
The balance of convenience between the party wishing the telephone
or video conference and the party or parties opposing; and
Any other relevant matter.5

Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg 194, r 1.08.
Ibid. In Ontario, the Civil Rules Committee has statutorily delegated power to make civil
rules of procedure, but the Committee’s agendas and minutes are not publicly available. See
Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C-43, s 66(1); Coulter A Osborne, Civil Justice Reform
Project: Summary of Findings and Recommendations (Toronto: Ontario Ministry of the
Attorney General, 2007) at 128 [Osborne Report]). Accordingly, there is no legislative history
that provides an official rationale for the introduction of Rule 1.08. Prior to the introduction
of Rule 1.08, however, video conferencing had been used to receive both motion and
trial evidence. See e.g. Guarantee Co of North America v Nuythen (1997), 119 ACWS (3d)
510, OJ No 5183 (QL) (Gen Div) (granting the plaintiff’s request to cross-examine the
defendant, resident in British Columbia, on his affidavit in relation to a pending summary
judgment motion); and Freeswick v Forbes (1996), 62 ACWS (3d) 910, OJ No 1266 (QL)
(Gen Div) at para 17 (reporting that one of the medical witnesses “testified at the trial by
way of video conference.”)). Moreover, there was express policy support for the adoption of
video-conferencing technology in civil cases (see e.g. Ontario Civil Justice Review, First Report
(Toronto: Ontario Ministry of Attorney General, 1995) at 18.4 [Ont CJR First Report];
and Ontario Civil Justice Review, Supplemental and Final Report (Toronto: Ontario Ministry
of Attorney General, 1996) at 4.5 [Ont CJR Final Report]. Notwithstanding the fact that
video-conferencing technology had been successfully used in a number of civil cases prior
to 1999, the absence of a specific rule permitting evidence to be received in this manner led
at least one judge to conclude that he did not have the discretion to admit such evidence
at trial over the objections of one of the parties (see Richard v Doell (1998), 77 ACWS (3d)
526, OJ No 660 (QL) (Gen Div)). The introduction of Rule 1.08 in 1999 served to clear up
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There have only been a handful of reported cases interpreting Rule 1.08, and
the rule has not yet been subject to review by the Court of Appeal for Ontario.6
One of the earliest reported cases that considered Rule 1.08, Pack All Manufacturing
Inc v Triad Plastics Inc,7 involved a plaintiff seeking an order under Rule 1.08 to
receive, by way of video conference, the trial evidence of a witness who worked
and resided in Virginia. The defendant had consented to the receipt of evidence
of other trial witnesses through video conferencing but took the position that
this particular witness needed to appear live at trial because of crucial credibility
issues. In considering the plaintiff’s motion, Justice Rutherford spoke favourably
of the available technology, commenting that,
In my experience, a trial judge can see, hear and evaluate a witness’ testimony very
well, assuming the video-conference arrangements are good. Seeing the witness, full
face on in colour and live in a conference facility is arguably as good or better than
seeing the same witness obliquely from one side as is the case in our traditional
courtrooms here in the Ottawa Court House.8

However, notwithstanding his positive view of video-conferencing technology,
Justice Rutherford ultimately dismissed the plaintiff’s motion. In reaching this
conclusion, he noted that taking evidence by video conference “is not a manner
of taking evidence available to the parties as a matter of right.”9 He further stated
that, despite his sympathy for time and cost savings associated with taking this
particular witness’ evidence through video conferencing, he was not convinced that
there was “enough to be gained to overcome the conventional rule that evidence
be given by a witness, in person, in court, and the contention by counsel for the
defendant that cross-examination of this important witness whose credibility is
important to the trial may be rendered less effective.”10 In reaching this decision,
Justice Rutherford accorded considerable weight to the fact that there was no
evidence that the witness in question was “unable or unwilling for any reason to
come to Ottawa and testify of her own volition.”11
any confusion regarding the authority of the court to allow witnesses to give trial testimony
through video conferencing.
6. In the category of reported cases, I include those cases electronically reported in the
Quicklaw and Westlaw commercial databases, the CanLII electronic collection, and those
published in official reporters.
7. (2001), 119 ACWS (3d) 240, OJ No 5882 (QL) (Sup Ct) [Pack All].
8. Ibid at para 6.
9. Ibid at para 11.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
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Following Justice Rutherford’s decision in Pack All Manufacturing, Ontario
courts have been hesitant to grant motions pursuant to Rule 1.08.12 In the reported
cases in which courts have permitted video-conferenced evidence, strong evidence
of the unavailability of a witness to attend at trial appears to operate as a dominant
factor. For example, in Archambault v Kalandi Anstalt,13 the court allowed a witness
residing in Austria to testify at trial through video conferencing notwithstanding
the witness’ admission that the reason she refused to attend the trial was that the
she had an outstanding Ontario judgment against her for more than 9 million
dollars. In granting the motion, Master Beaudoin stated that his “ultimate concern
is that there will be a full adjudication of the issues in this dispute”14 and found
that there was “no evidence of prejudice” if the witness was permitted to give her
evidence through video conferencing.15
In two recent decisions, Ontario courts have granted orders allowing videoconferenced testimony where it was not contended that such witnesses would
be unavailable. In these cases, however, the relevant witnesses lived far from
Canada. In Paiva v Corpening,16 a decision released in February 2012, Justice
12. See Feeney v Labatt (2007), 154 ACWS (3d) 831 at para 12, OJ No 258 (QL) (Master). The
court denied the defendant’s motion to have the evidence of a Belgian resident received by
video conference notwithstanding the court’s acceptance of Justice Rutherford’s comments
regarding the minimal effect of video-conference testimony on credibility assessments. The
witness in this case was said, through an affidavit of one of his lawyers, to be scheduled to
be on holidays and then in board meetings during the two weeks of trial. In rejecting the
defendant’s motion, Master Brott stated that she was “not convinced that [the defendant]
should be able to overcome the general principle that evidence is to be given in person in a
courtroom, simply because [the witness] has a busy schedule and wants to spend time with
his family.” See also Lynch v Segal, [2005] OJ No 1275 at para 4 (QL) (Sup Ct). The court
denied a motion to have a witness’ testimony received through video-conferencing on the
basis that his testimony would be important and involve serious issues of credibility and,
therefore, “should be presented in open court in the presence of the trial judge.”
13. (2006),150 ACWS (3d) 811 at para 18, OJ No 3428 (QL) (Sup Ct), aff’d (2007), 154
ACWS (3d) 831, OJ No 258 (QL) (Sup Ct).
14. Ibid at para 27.
15. Ibid at para 26. Other cases evidence a similar focus on the unavailability of witnesses.
See e.g. Maggio Holding Inc v Carrier Canada Ltd, [2003] OJ No 1810 (QL) (Sup Ct) at
para 3 (permitting the evidence of a witness residing in Texas to be received through video
conferencing under Rule 1.08 after the witness “made it clear he [would] not voluntarily
attend at trial”); Yunger v Zolty, 2011 ONSC 5943 at para 120, OJ No 4459 (QL) (ordering
the grandfather of children involved in a family law dispute to give his testimony remotely
through SkypeTM or another video-conferencing technology after he refused to travel from
Switzerland, where he lived, to Toronto for questioning).
16. [2012] ONCJ No 88, OJ No 771 (QL).
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Murray granted a request by an applicant mother in a family law dispute to
allow for her and her spouse, who lived in Denmark, to be cross-examined via
video conferencing (using Skype™ technology) at trial. She argued that requiring
her and her spouse to travel to Toronto to testify would be financially burdensome
and would create child-care problems. A month later, in Aly v Halal Meat Inc,17
Justice Ricchetti considered a pre-trial motion by the plaintiffs to call two
witnesses at trial via live Skype™ video link. The witnesses resided in Egypt and
China, respectively, and cited travel time and cost as the basis for requesting the
order. Ultimately, Justice Ricchetti granted an order allowing only one of the
witnesses—who was to give brief evidence that was not central to any of the
issues to be tried—to testify via Skype™. Notwithstanding his expressed confidence
in Skype™ technology and in the ability of the court to assess demeanour in the
case of video-conferenced evidence, Justice Ricchetti rejected the request to have
the evidence of the second witness presented by way of video conferencing, noting
that the evidence could be central to one of the issues to be decided.
It is difficult to draw generalizations from the handful of reported cases
under Rule 1.08. This difficulty is compounded by the existence of a number
of reported cases in which courts have received video-conferenced trial evidence,
but which are not accompanied by a reported motion under Rule 1.08 and do
not include a discussion in the reported judgment of the circumstances under
which the decision was made to admit the video-conferenced evidence.18
Nevertheless, it seems clear from the reported cases interpreting Rule 1.08 that
the courts have given significant weight to the first factor listed in the Rule: “the
general principle that evidence and argument should be presented orally in open
court.”19 With this principle as the baseline, video conferencing is treated as a
technological tool to be used sparingly. Overall, the approach is one of caution.

17. [2012] ONCJ No 199 at para 30, ONSC 2585.
18. See e.g. Korea Data Systems Co v Aamazing Technologies Inc, 2012 ONSC 3922 at para 154,
OJ No 3202 (QL) (reporting that witness from Taiwan gave his evidence through video
conferencing); Braafhart v Braafhart, 2011 ONSC 270 at para 15, OJ No 1132 (QL)
(reporting that one witness “provided his evidence by way of video conference over the
internet utilizing the services of Skype”); Malenfant v Lavergne, 2010 ONSC 2894 at para 3, OJ
No 2669 (QL) [Malenfant] (reporting that “[d]uring the trial, the evidence of the witnesses
in London and Victoria were heard by video link”); Billings v Mississauga (City), 2010 ONSC
3101 at para 50, OJ No 3304 (QL) (reporting that one witness “testified at this trial by
video link”).
19. Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 4.
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B. THE DOMINANT POLICY APPROACH TO COURTROOM TECHNOLOGIES

The courts’ cautious approach to video conferencing is difficult to reconcile with
expressed policy objectives encouraging the use of new technologies in Ontario’s
civil justice system. Embracing innovative technological solutions as a means
of improving the effectiveness of the civil justice system has long been a stated
policy goal of the Ontario government and judiciary. Even prior to the introduction of Rule 1.08, both the 1995 First Report of the Ontario Civil Justice Review
(“First Report”) and the 1996 Supplemental and Final Report (“Final Report”)
were enthusiastic about the use of video-conferencing technology. The First Report
recommended, under the heading “The Need For Video Conferencing,” that “a
pilot project be established to test the utility of video conferencing technology
in civil matters.”20 The First Report took the position that “there is little doubt that
video conferencing technology creates the potential for reduced costs and greater
flexibility in the system.”21
In response to the First Report, several pilot projects were established. The
evaluations of these projects in the 1996 Supplemental and Final Report of the
Civil Justice Review focused on cost savings and convenience, reporting that “[i]n
several civil matters, including a civil jury trial, witnesses have been examined
and cross-examined by video with positive results—and in the process, saving
substantial travel costs to the parties and allowing scheduled trials to proceed
as planned.”22 The endorsement of video-conferencing technology in these
reports was one manifestation of a broader recognition that there was “a need
to modernize” Ontario’s civil justice system and leave behind “outdated approaches
to conducting business.”23
Roughly a decade later, the Civil Justice Reform Project headed by Justice
Coulter Osborne also addressed technology issues. The 2007 Osborne Report
recommended, among other things, that “[t]he judiciary and courts administration
should make every reasonable effort to accommodate requests for the use of
technology in individual cases, where possible.”24 Moreover, it specifically
recommended that Rule 1.08 be amended to provide express authority for the
court to order that a matter be heard by video conference on its own initiative.25
Although there was no elaboration of the rationale for this recommendation,
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Ont CJR First Report, supra note 5 at 18.4.
Ibid.
Ont CJR Final Report, supra note 5.
Ont CJR First Report, supra note 5 at 18.1.
Osborne Report, supra note 5 at xxi.
Ibid.
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the underlying assumption seemed to be that video conferencing is a positive
development and that courts should have greater autonomy to direct its use.
Ultimately, the recommended amendment was made in 2008 alongside a series
of other reforms to the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure. The Osborne Report also
referred positively to initiatives undertaken by the Court Services Division (the
branch of Ontario’s Ministry of the Attorney General responsible for technology
issues in the courts) since 2001, including the installation of video-conferencing
equipment in fifty-one court locations and the creation of a model electronic
courtroom in Toronto “to service a high-volume commercial court and support
large volumes of evidence, electronic evidence presentation and remote witness
testimony, particularly in multi-jurisdictional hearings.”26
In a speech marking the opening of the courts for 2008, Ontario’s then
Attorney General echoed the Osborne Report’s call for reform in the province’s
justice system, commenting: “We have the opportunity to take the same reformist
approach that we apply to others, and apply it to ourselves. Society has gone
from the encyclopedia to Google, from fax to Facebook, in less than five years.
Time is moving on. The challenges are now.”27 Similar sentiments are evident
in Chief Justice Annemarie Bonkalo’s speech that marked the opening of the
Ontario Court of Justice in 2010, wherein she noted: “The information technology
revolution continues to offer new opportunities to improve service, access to
justice and transparency.”28
More recent government publications reveal continuing enthusiasm for
video-conferencing technology. The 2010-2011 Annual Report of the Court
Services Division of the Ministry of the Attorney General reports that “[t]he
Court Services Division is committed to continually upgrading and enhancing
the use of modern technology in support of the courts” and has “one of the largest
high-speed videoconferencing networks in the world,” through which “the justice
sector in Ontario leverages technology to increase access to justice for those in
remote communities as well as within larger urban centres, minimizing the need
for travel and effectively reducing the environmental impact of bringing people

26. Ibid at 123.
27. The Honourable Chris Bentley, “Attorney General Addresses Opening of the Courts of
Ontario for 2008” (Speech delivered at the Toronto Court House on 9 September 2008),
online: Ministry of the Attorney General <http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/
news/2008/20080909-oc-sp.asp>.
28. Chief Justice Annemarie E Bonkalo, “2010 Opening of the Courts Speech” (Delivered at the
Ontario Court of Justice on 14 September 2010), online: Ontario Court of Justice <http://
www.ontariocourts.ca/ocj/ocj/publications/2010-report-of-ontario-court-of-justice>.
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together.”29 The 2011-2012 Annual Report is equally enthusiastic, reporting,
among other things, that “[w]ith the Northwest’s unique geographic challenges,
video conferencing continues to increase access to justice across the region”
and that one “[a]ccomplishment” in 2011-2012 was that the Court Services
Division “[c]ommenced the planning phase of a pilot project for mobile video
conferencing technology.”30
Advocacy bodies for the legal profession have likewise embraced court
technologies. In its 1996 Systems of Civil Justice Task Force Report, the Canadian
Bar Association took the position that “[t]he integration of modern computer,
electronic, telephonic, and video technology in court operations is crucial to the
creation of a viable multi-option civil justice system.”31 This report also contended
that “[t]here is a large role for technology in assisting reform efforts by increasing
access and reducing costs”32 and that “the courts of the twenty-first century should
have the technological capacity to … incorporate interactive video technology into
justice proceedings when warranted.”33 In 2007, the Ontario Bar Association held
a stakeholder summit with the goal of developing recommendations for improving
the accessibility of the legal justice system. Among its recommendations, the
Association endorsed the continued use of video-conferencing technology in civil
cases “to facilitate access to the court, especially in the more remote regions of the
province.”34 The attitude towards video conferencing in these policy documents
is captured in an article in the Canadian Bar Association’s National Magazine,
which referred to video conferencing as “a positive tool that offers efficiencies and
opportunities that result in justice better served with less wait time.”35
In summary, a review of the policy discourse surrounding video-conferencing
technology in particular and court technologies more generally reveals an almost
exclusively evaluative focus on the ability of these technologies to perform their
intended use. With the assumption that video-conferencing technology can
provide cheaper, more convenient presentation of witness evidence at trial,36 the
29. Ministry of the Attorney General, Court Services Division, Annual Report 2010-2011
(Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General, 2011) at 48.
30. Ministry of the Attorney General, Court Services Division, Annual Report 2011-2012
(Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General, 2012) at A15.
31. Canadian Bar Association, Systems of Civil Justice Task Force Report (Ottawa: Canadian Bar
Association, 1996) at 60.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Ontario Bar Association, Getting It Right: The Report of the Ontario Bar Association Justice
Stakeholder Summit (Edmonton: Canadian Forum on Civil Justice, 2008) at 11, 22.
35. Katya Hodge, “Video Conferencing,” CBA National Magazine (September 2011) 11 at 11.
36. It should be noted that the accuracy of this assumption itself (or, at the very least, its
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increased use of this technology is treated as a positive development. In this
equation, efficiency is the guiding norm and improved access is repeatedly cited
as the policy goal driving the desire for greater efficiency through increased use
of technology. The overall attitude towards technology is optimistic and there is
a sense of inevitability about further integration of technology in the civil justice
system. As Ontario’s former Attorney General stated in his 2008 speech marking
the opening of the courts, “[t]ime is moving on.”37

II. TOWARDS AN EVALUATIVE FRAMEWORK:
PERSPECTIVES ON TECHNOLOGY
Embedded in the aforementioned policy discourse is an approach to technology
that includes certain assumptions about technology and about society’s interaction
with it. This approach can be seen as reflecting a narrow instrumental view of
technology. Much more could be (and, indeed, has been) said about instrumental
and other competing perspectives on technology. My account is necessarily brief,
highlighting particular features of an instrumental perspective as well as certain
critiques of this perspective that assist in situating the remainder of my analysis.38
Andrew Feenburg describes the instrumental theories of technology as offering
“the most widely accepted view of technology.”39 Under this view, technology
is treated as “completely neutral, solely serving the intended purposes held for
it by its users”40 and as indifferent to politics or social contexts.41 Moreover, the
ability of humans to control technological outcomes is emphasized.42 As a result, our
relationship with technology is presumed to be straightforward. Conventional views
of technology, as Langdon Winner explains, include the following perspective:

37.
38.

39.

40.
41.
42.

universal accuracy) is not self-evident. See Asco Construction Ltd v Epoxy Solutions Inc, 2011
ONSC 4464 at para 20, OJ No 3406 (QL) (determining “that it was less expensive to have the
witnesses attend in person at trial than to have their evidence transmitted via video conference”).
Bentley, supra note 27.
As is reflected in the text in this section and the accompanying citations, the framework
outlined here draws heavily from work by Andrew Feenberg and Arthur J Cockfield
discussing and contrasting instrumental and substantive theories or perspectives of
technology.
Andrew Feenberg, Transforming Technology: A Critical Theory Revisited, 2d ed (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2002) at 5. See also, Arthur Cockfield & Jason Pridmore, “A
Synthetic Theory of Law and Technology” (2007) 8 Minn J L Sci & Tech 475 at 479.
Ibid at 480.
Feenburg, supra note 39 at 5, 6. See also ibid.
See e.g. Arthur J Cockfield, “Individual Autonomy, Law and Technology: Should Soft
Determinism Guide Legal Analysis?” (2010) 30:1 Bulletin Sci Tech & Soc 4.
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Once things have been made, we interact with them on occasion to achieve certain
specific purposes. One picks up a tool, uses it, and puts it down. One picks up a
telephone, talks on it, and then does not use it for a time. A person gets on an airplane,
flies from Point A to Point B, and then gets off. The proper interpretation of the
meaning of technology in the mode of use seems to be nothing more complicated
than an occasional, limited, and nonproblematic interaction.43

Given these features, it is not surprising that those holding an instrumental
view “are often optimistic about technology”44 and often take the position that
“technologies should be adopted as long as they promote an instrumental purpose
that enhances efficiency.”45
Instrumental perspectives form a dichotomy with “substantive” perspectives
on technology, which “emphasize the ways in which technological systems (or
‘structure’) can have a substantive impact on individual and community interests
that may differ from technology’s intended impact.”46 Substantive theories of
technology reject the proposition that technology is neutral and take a much
more skeptical view of our capacity to exercise agency to control technology.
The notion of “technological determinism” is often connected with substantive
theories, wherein technology is framed “to greater or lesser extents, as inherently
possessing a structure that in turn produces a society that must act or exist in
certain ways.”47 For this reason, substantive theories risk criticism for “pay[ing]
insufficient heed to the importance of human agency.”48 A softer view of
determinism can be found in Feenberg’s description of substantive theories of
technology. He writes, “[T]he issue is not that machines have ‘taken over,’ but
that in choosing to use them we make many unwitting commitments.”49 Similar
sentiments, expressed more dramatically, can be found in the following oft-quoted
passage written by Winner:
New technologies are institutional structures within an evolving constitution that
gives shape to a new polity, the technopolis in which we do increasingly live. For
the most part, this constitution still evolves with little public scrutiny or debate.
Shielded by the conviction that technology is neutral and tool-like, a whole new
43. Langdon Winner, “Technology as Forms of Life” in David M Kaplan, ed, Readings in
the Philosophy of Technology (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004) 103 at 104 [Winner,
“Technology as Forms of Life”].
44. Cockfield & Pridmore, supra note 39 at 482.
45. Arthur J Cockfield, “Towards a Law and Technology Theory” (2004) 30:3 Man LJ 383 at
386, n 10.
46. Cockfield, supra note 42 at 4.
47. Cockfield & Pridmore, supra note 39 at 489.
48. Ibid at 498.
49. Feenburg, supra note 39 at 7.
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order is built—piecemeal, step by step, with the parts and pieces linked together in
novel ways—without the slightest public awareness or opportunity to dispute the
character of the changes underway. It is somnambulism (rather than determinism)
that characterizes technological politics—on the left, right, and center equally.50

To be sure, setting up this dichotomy of instrumental and substantive
perspectives is, as Arthur Cockfield acknowledges, “a reductionist way of looking
at perspectives on technology, as each of these theoretical frames is far more
complex than this dichotomy suggests.”51 Nonetheless, it is a helpful way to begin
to think about what a defensible, nuanced perspective on technology might look
like. Both Feenburg and Cockfield use the limitations associated with these two
dichotomous perspectives as a jumping-off point to developing their own unique
theoretical accounts.
My account jumps off from one of the major criticisms of an instrumental
perspective, namely that it “tends to underappreciate the complex interaction
between law, technology and human institutions that can lead to unanticipated
and adverse social policy outcomes.”52 In other words, while instrumental
perspectives provide “a prediction of the future based on the potentials for and
use of new technology … they rarely problematize the technologies themselves.”53
However, as Winner observes, “[i]f the experience of modern society shows us
anything … it is that technologies are not merely aids to human activity, but also
powerful forces acting to reshape that activity and its meaning.”54
The dominant policy discourse described above in Part I fails to problematize
video-conferencing technology itself by focusing almost exclusively on the technical
capacity of video conferencing to deliver cost and time savings. This is a serious
shortcoming, in my view, because it excludes from the conversation potentially
significant consequences of the use of video-conferencing technology, including
broader social and political implications. As expressed by Winner, “we [need to]
pay attention not only to the making of physical instruments and processes …
but also to the production of psychological, social and political conditions as part
of any significant technological change.”55
With a view to introducing some of these potentially significant consequences
into the conversation, in Part III I canvass how video conferencing, as a mediating
50. Langdon Winner, Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-Control as a Theme in Political
Thought (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1978) at 324.
51. Cockfield & Pridmore, supra note 39 at 494.
52. Ibid at 498.
53. Ibid at 481-82.
54. Winner, “Technologies as Forms of Life,” supra note 43 at 105.
55. Ibid at 112.
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technology, may unintentionally interfere with assessments of witness credibility
and impede emotional connections between courtroom participants. I also explore
the potential broader legal and social implications. Following this, in Part IV, I
change focus and examine the ways in which video conferencing—by disrupting
the geography of adjudication—may threaten the solemnity associated with, and
respect given to, the civil justice system.

III. UNINTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE: EFFECTS ON
CREDIBILITY ASSESSMENTS AND EMOTIONAL
CONNECTIVITY
As noted above in Part I, the dominant policy discourse with respect to video
conferencing reflects the view that video conferencing should be embraced
because it enhances the efficiency of witness testimony delivery by reducing cost
and increasing convenience. Underlying this view is the implicit assumption that
video conferencing performs the task of transmitting remote testimony well. In
the past, the idea that this technology could effectively transmit witness testimony
was not without controversy. One of the most prominent arguments against
video-conferencing technology was that technical issues—such as time delays
and poor audio and picture quality—would impede the ability of the court and
counsel to interact with and assess witnesses.56 The underlying concern was that
these types of technical issues would affect the integrity of a legal proceeding by
interfering with credibility assessments.
56. See the criminal case of R v Chapple, 2005 BCSC 383 at para 17, BCJ No 585 (QL).
The court found that the poor quality of evidence received against an accused through a
video-link—including a time delay between question and answers and “somewhat difficult”
audio—contributed to precluding the accused from making a full answer and defense. See
e.g. Lorne Sossin & Zimra Yetnikoff, “I Can See Clearly Now: Videoconference Hearings and
the Legal Limit on How Tribunals Allocate Resources” (2007) 25:2 Windsor YB Access Just
247 at 259. The authors note two other cases where these types of problems were manifest:
Videoconferencing technology may not always be of a standard high enough to guarantee fairness. In R. v. Raj, the court agreed with the defendant’s assertion that the video link made it
difficult to assess body language and discern expressions. Furthermore, there was only a single
camera angle available, and there was a delay between the questions and the witness’ answers.
The court concluded that these defaults in the technology impaired the defendant’s ability to
make full answer and defence and rejected the use of videoconferencing in that case. In R. v.
Gates, the court concluded that video equipment which did not allow the parties to see and
speak to each other simultaneously violated s. 650 of the Criminal Code, which requires the
accused to be present at all stages of the trial.
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However, with improvements to video-conferencing technology in recent
years, governments and the courts have expressed greater confidence in the
technical quality of the remote testimony received. As mentioned earlier, Justice
Rutherford reports in Pack All Manufacturing that “a trial judge can see, hear and
evaluate a witness’ testimony very well, assuming the video-conference arrangements
are good.” He speculates that video conferencing might even provide a better
view of witnesses than that available in a traditional courtroom.57 In a civil case
heard in 2010, Justice Ray commented that “the technology for video links has
improved enormously over recent years” and that the specific video-conferencing
technology used in that case was “of excellent quality.”58 Likewise, a recent
government announcement of a video-conferencing pilot project in Sandy Lake
First Nation reports that “you are able to see, hear and carry on a meeting as if
you were in the same room.”59 The impression left is that video-conferencing
technology and in-person appearance can now be considered equally acceptable
means of receiving evidence.
What these accounts fail to recognize, however, is that beyond easily
observable technical issues of picture quality and synchrony, there are good
reasons that we should be concerned about using video-conferencing technology
to transmit evidence. Notwithstanding technical improvements in the available
technology, there remain risks of significant unintended effects on both credibility
assessments and on the emotional connections created between courtroom
participants. In this Part, I examine these two types of potential unintended
effects and canvass their broader legal and political implications.
A. CREDIBILITY ASSESSMENTS

Broadly, the concern in relation to credibility assessments is essentially McLuhanian: that the “medium is the message.” In Marshall McLuhan’s own words:
… it is the medium that shapes and controls the scale and form of human
association and action. The content or uses of such media are as diverse as
they are ineffectual in shaping the form of human association. Indeed, it is only too
typical that the ‘content’ of any medium blinds us to the character of the medium.60

57. Pack All, supra note 7 at para 6.
58. Malenfant, supra note 18 at paras 2-3.
59. Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, “Sandy Lake First Nation Video-Conferencing
Pilot Project,” online: <http://sandylake.firstnation.ca/system/files/Sandy Lake First Nation
Video Conferencing Pilot Project Feb 2012.pdf>.
60. Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (Cambridge, Mass: MIT
Press, 1994) at 9.
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In his analysis of the use of video-conferencing technology in Immigration
and Refugee Board hearings, Mark Federman draws on McLuhan’s work to explore
how video conferencing—as a mediating technology—might affect the receipt
and assessment of claimant testimony. Federman highlights a number of factors
possibly at play, including “the effects of distortions in experiencing non-verbal
communication, or those induced by shifted eye-contact (through non-alignment
of viewing screen and camera angle)” and “the effects a video-mediated environment
may have on encouraging or detecting deception.”61 Other research has traced
how choice of camera shot—for example, a head shot versus a full body shot—or
the lighting in a remote facility can affect how a witness is perceived in court
and has outlined the limited ability of video-conferencing technology to capture
nonverbal cues.62 In short, there is compelling evidence that “every technological
choice will influence the way … [a witness] is perceived, often in ways that cannot
be precisely predicted or reliably controlled.”63
Video conferencing, as a mediating technology, may impede assessments of
credibility in subtle, but important ways.64 In one oft-cited study,65 the authors
61. Mark Federman, “On the Media Effects of Immigration and Refugee Board Hearings via
Videoconference” (2006) 19:4 J Refugee Stud 433 at 436. Other commentators have raised
similar issues. See e.g. Michael D Roth, “Laissez-Faire Videoconferencing: Remote Witness
Testimony and Adversarial Truth” (2000) 48:1 UCLA L Rev 185 at 198. Roth observes that,
Nobody claims that “[v]ideo images are ... adequate substitutes of live interactions.” Like television, video does not accurately simulate human perceptions. Both mediums can exaggerate
certain personal traits that are commonly used to evaluate a witness’s demeanor such as blemishes, shadows, and hair growth. Filming can add weight or emphasize scars. “When a person
is viewed in the unnatural conditions imposed on him by [a video medium], many of [the]
usual clues to his character are [altered]” [footnotes omitted].

62. See Elizabeth Wiggins, “What We Know and What We Need to Know About the Effects
of Courtroom Technology,” (2004) 12:3 Wm & Mary Bill Rts J 731 at 737. Wiggins cites
the program of research conducted by Daniel Lassiter and his colleagues on videotaped
confessions, which concluded that “evaluations of videotaped confessions can be significantly
altered by seemingly inconsequential changes in the camera perspective when confessions are
initially recorded.” See also, Anne Bowen Poulin, “Criminal Justice and Videoconferencing
Technology: The Remote Defendant” (2004) 78:4 Tul L Rev 1089, at 1108-11. For
discussion about the possible effects of lighting and background on how a witness will
be perceived, see e.g. David Tait et al, “Gateways to Justice: Improving Video-mediated
Communications for Justice Participants’ Project Progress Update 15 June 2009,” online:
<http://www.justiceenvironments.edu.au/attachments/progress-report-15-june-2009-2.
p0.pdf>. See also, the discussion in Susan J Drucker & Janice Platt Hunold, “Videotaped
Depositions: The Media Perspective” (1988) 60:1 Ny St BJ 38, 42-44.
63. Poulin, supra note 62 at 1120.
64. Ibid at 1114-15.
65. Gail S Goodman et al, “Face-to-Face Confrontation: Effects of Closed-Circuit Technology
on Children’s Eyewitness Testimony and Jurors’ Decisions” (1998) 22:2 L and Hum Behav
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concluded, among other things, that “[c]hildren who testified via CCTV [closed
circuit television] were viewed as less believable than children who testified in
regular trials, despite the fact that, if anything, children who testified via CCTV
were more accurate.”66 Based on these observations, the authors recommended
that “due to jurors’ negative biases towards child witnesses when CCTV was
employed, attorneys may choose to leave closed-circuit testimony for the most
extreme circumstances.”67
To be sure, other studies have reported more encouraging results when it
comes to assessing the credibility of a remote witness. For example, some
experiments have shown that juries react similarly to experts who testify remotely
as they do to experts who provide their evidence while physically in the courtroom.68
Moreover, it bears noting that the above-quoted study on child witnesses and
CCTV technology also concluded that the technology “generally promoted
more accurate testimony in children”69 and that the findings did not support
the proposition that the use of the technology impairs the ability of fact-finders
to evaluate the accuracy of child witnesses.70 Ultimately, however, there remain
many questions regarding the unintended effects of video-conferencing technology
on credibility assessments. The literature is rife with calls for more research.71
165. This study has been cited repeatedly in the literature relating to video-conferencing
technology. See e.g. Poulin, supra note 62; Shari Seidman Diamond et al, “Efficiency and
Cost: The Impact of Videoconferenced Hearings on Bail Decisions” (2010) 100 J Crim L
& Criminology 869; Molly Treadway Johnson & Elizabeth Wiggins “Videoconferencing in
Criminal Proceedings: Legal and Empirical Issues and Directions for Research” (2006) 28
Law & Pol’y 211.
66. Goodman et al, supra note 65 at 199.
67. Ibid.
68. See Frederic Lederer, “The Legality and Practicality of Remote Witness Testimony” (2009)
20:5 Prac Litigator 19 at 21. Lederer explains:
Insofar as the CLCT has been able to ascertain, remote appearances appear to be treated
by courtroom participants just as if those persons were physically in the courtroom. Some
years ago we conducted two separate scientifically controlled experiments conducted over two
academic years under the supervision of then William & Mary psychology professor Kelly
Shaver. They demonstrated that in civil personal injury jury trials in which damage verdicts
relied upon the testimony of medical experts, there was no statistically significant difference
in verdict whether the experts were physically in the courtroom or elsewhere, at least so long
as witness images are displayed life-size behind the witness stand and the witness is subject to
cross-examination under oath. Years of non-controlled experiments in criminal Laboratory
Trials suggest that the same result applies to merits witnesses in criminal cases.

69. Goodman et al, supra note 65 at 197.
70. Ibid at 198.
71. See e.g. Johnson & Wiggins, supra note 65.
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B. EMOTIONAL CONNECTIONS

A second set of issues relates to the impact of the technology on the ability of
courtroom participants to connect emotionally with witnesses. In a study performed
outside the courtroom context, researchers concluded that persons form less
positive impressions in interactions with colleagues mediated through videoconferencing technology than in face-to-face interactions.72 As Anne Bowen Poulin
reports, “There is ample evidence that one effect of video is to make the person
portrayed harder for the audience to relate to.”73 In the legal context, the concern
is, stated generally, that the use of technology risks creating a “dehumanizing”74
barrier between the remote witness and those physically present in the courtroom.
A chilling example can be found in a 2005 report regarding the use of video
conferencing to conduct hearings for detained immigrants in removal proceedings
in Chicago. One of the trained observers participating in the study noted the
indifference displayed by the lawyers and the judges in the video-conference
hearings and cited the following example:
[The immigrant on the video] was sobbing. She looked like she was a teenager. No
one even noticed how stressed out she was. Everyone was stapling exhibits and passing
papers, and then it was over … . No one explained why … [the case] was being
continued. Her usual attorney wasn’t there. It seems like her condition might
have had more of an impact had she been in the courtroom, but no one even
noticed her.75

In addition to qualitative observations like this, a number of quantitative
studies suggest that individuals who appear in court via video conferencing are
at risk of receiving harsher treatment from judges or other adjudicators. For
example, one study on the use of video conferencing in asylum removal hearings
reported that the use of this technology “roughly doubles to a statistically significant
degree the likelihood that an applicant will be denied asylum.”76 Similarly, a study
72. John Storck & Lee Sproull, “Through a Glass Darkly: What Do People Learn in VideoConferences” (1995) 22:2 Hum Comm Res 197.
73. Poulin, supra note 62 at 1118.
74. Johnson & Wiggins, supra note 65 at 215. See also Aaron Haas, “Videoconferencing in
Immigration Proceedings” (2006) 5:1 Pierce L Rev 59 at 74-77; Frank M Walsh & Edward
M Walsh, “Effective Processing or Assembly-Line Justice? The Use of Teleconferencing in
Asylum Removal Hearings” (2008) 22:2 Geo Immig LJ 259 at 269-70.
75. The Legal Assistance Foundation Metropolitan Chicago & Chicago Appleseed Fund for
Justice, Videoconferencing in Removal Proceedings: A Case Study of the Chicago Immigration
Court (2005), online: <http://chicagoappleseed.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/
videoconfreport_080205.pdf>. See also Haas, supra note 74 at 78.
76. Walsh & Walsh, supra note 74 at 259.
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analysing a Cook County, Illinois, program mandating that certain bail hearings
be held via video conference noted that defence counsel repeatedly criticized the
system as “a grossly demeaning ‘cattle call.’”77 The study reported on empirical
research that showed, among other things, that “[f ]or all combined offenses that
shifted to televised bail hearings, [the change in the average bail amount] … was
an increase of roughly $20,958 or 51%.”78 Although the authors of the article
note that the possible reasons behind this result are complex—and may include
the effects of poor equipment79—they also cautioned that there may be “something
about the presence of a live individual that cannot be replicated, even with
modern technology.”80
The potential that video-conferencing technology will impede emotional
connections between courtroom participants and foster harsher interactions that
impact outcomes is of particular concern in criminal and immigration proceedings
where individuals are detained and their liberty is at stake. However, this risk
should also concern us in the context of less serious criminal proceedings and in
civil proceedings where the stakes are arguably lower. These proceedings are still
an integral part of our justice system and impact the lives of individuals.81
Judith Resnik and Dennis Curtis explore how the phenomenon of “adjudication
can itself be [understood as] … a kind of democratic practice.”82 Under this account,
public adjudication manifests itself as a democratic practice in several respects. For
example, the public nature of adjudication through open court proceedings can
be seen as enabling people to observe and contest the exercise of public and
77. Diamond et al, supra note 65 at 885.
78. Ibid at 892.
79. Ibid at 898-99. Regarding the quality of the equipment, the authors observed, inter alia,
that “[t]he picture quality and sound available today are far superior to the technology that
existed when the equipment was installed in Cook County” and that the placement of the
equipment resulted in defendants possibly looking as if they were intentionally avoiding eye
contact.
80. Ibid at 900.
81. See Judith Resnik and Dennis Curtis, Representing Justice: Invention, Controversy, and Rights
in City-States and Democratic Courtrooms (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011) at 301:
What is the utility of having a window into the mundane [as well as the dramatic]? That is
where people live, and that is where state control can be both useful and yet overreaching.
The dense and tedious repetition of ordinary exchanges is where one finds the enormity of the
power of both bureaucratic states and private sector actors. That power is at risk of operating
unseen. The redundancy of various claims of right and the processes, allegations, and behaviors that become the predicates to judgments can fuel debate not only about the responses in
particular cases but also about what the underlying norms ought to be.

82. Judith Resnik, “Bring Back Bentham: ‘Open Courts,’ ‘Terror Trials,’ and Public Sphere(s)”
(2011) 5:1 L & Ethics of Human Rights 1 at 53.
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private power as well as participate in the elaboration and reconfiguration of
norms. By seeing the law in action, “the public and the immediate participants
can see that law varies by context, decisionmakers, litigants and facts … [and]
gain a chance to argue that the governing rules or their applications are wrong.”83
Importantly for the purposes of the analysis in this section, Resnik and Curtis
explore adjudication as a process that can dignify litigants by “engender[ing]
participatory obligations and enact[ing] democratic precepts of equality.”84 Public
adjudication, they write, is “an odd moment in which individuals can oblige
others to treat them as equals as they argue in public about their disagreements,
misbehavior, wrongdoing, and obligations. Litigation forces dialogue on the
unwilling (including the government) and momentarily alters configurations of
authority.”85 The aspiration to participatory parity—the exhortation to audi
et alteram partem (to hear the other side)—is another way, according to these
authors, that courts can be “a great leveler.”86 If video-conferencing technology
interferes with emotional connections between courtroom participants, there is
good reason to be concerned that it threatens democratic aspirations to such parity.
In other words, if those physically present in the courtroom have difficulties relating
to remote witnesses and, in turn, those witnesses find the process of testifying
dehumanizing, the function of courts as “potentially egalitarian venues” is
undermined.87 In addition to implicating democratic values, the legitimacy of the
legal system is possibly at risk. As Daniel Markovits has observed:
[T]here exists substantial evidence that people’s compliance with the law, as it is applied
to them, depends significantly on their judgments concerning the legitimacy of
authorities who apply it, and that judgments concerning legitimacy, in turn, depend
on judgments concerning the procedures that the authorities employ in determining
what law requires, and especially in resolving disputes about this.88

If this is indeed true and if the use of video-conferencing technology results
in participants having a diminished subjective sense of inclusion in the legal process,
83. Resnik & Curtis, supra note 81 at 304. As the authors elaborate, “our argument is that …
[adjudication] offers opportunities for democratic norms to be implemented through the
millions of exchanges in courts among judges, the audience and the litigants ... courts are an
important component of functioning democracies seeking to demonstrate legitimacy through
displaying what qualities of governance are valued.”
84. Ibid at 301.
85. Ibid at 303.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid at 304.
88. Daniel Markovits, A Modern Legal Ethics: Adversary Advocacy in a Democratic Age (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2008) at 189 [footnotes omitted].

450

(2012) 50 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

then there is good reason to see the use of this technology as a risk vis-à-vis legitimacy
accorded to the legal system by the public.
These concerns regarding risks to democratic values and the legitimacy of
the legal system are compounded when one considers that video-conferencing
technology has been viewed as a panacea for addressing access to justice problems
faced by northern Canadian communities.89 Many of these northern communities
include significant Aboriginal populations, members of which face systemic
discrimination in the justice system and experience significantly disproportionate
levels of illness, poverty, unemployment, and incarceration. Although videoconferencing technology holds promise in making access to the courts more
convenient and more affordable for northern populations, the quality of this
access is an important consideration that needs to be part of the equation. To the
extent that these communities are already marginalized in relation to the exercise
of political and legal power in Canada, the fact that these communities may
disproportionately experience the possible negative effects of court technologies
on the quality of adjudication is a critical concern.90
C. MANAGING RISK

One obvious response to concerns about the unintended effects of videoconferencing technology on assessments of credibility and on the formation of
emotional connections is to conduct more research on this issue in order to
better understand these phenomena and to allow decision makers to modify
their behaviour accordingly, perhaps by developing a series of best practices for
different contexts. The studies cited above did not involve a review of the use of
video-conferencing technology in Ontario’s civil justice system; rather, they studied
89. I thank Jane Bailey for bringing this particular concern to my attention. In the Australian
context, Anne Wallace has helpfully written about the importance of taking into account the
specific social and cultural context of using video conferencing in Aboriginal communities
in remote Australia. See e.g. Anne Wallace, “‘Virtual Justice in the Bush’: The Use of Court
Technology in Remote and Regional Australia” (2008) 19:1 J L Inf & Sci 1.
90. See e.g. Ont CJR First Report, supra note 5. This report states:
Finally, we believe that the use of video conferencing has particular potential to benefit
members of the public, the Bar, administrators and judges in the northern parts of Ontario.
Distances define the North. All of the characteristics which make video conferencing attractive
in any environment, make it doubly so for those who must have access to the courts in the
North East and North West Regions of the Province.

See also British Columbia Ministry of the Attorney General, “Courts innovate with
videoconferencing solutions” (22 December 2011), online: BC Government Online News
Source <http://www.newsroom.gov.bc.ca/2011/12/courts-innovate-with-videoconferencingsolutions.html>.
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very different contexts and different, often inferior, technological equipment.91 In
short, there is much we do not know about the possible effects of using the
technology that is available today in this province’s civil courts.
The question remains, however, of what to do in the interim while this
research is being conducted. Because of the democratic values at play and the
potentially vulnerable populations involved, I argue that caution is warranted.
In his study on the impact of video-conferencing technology on the Mexican
immigrant community in the United States, Eugenio Mollo Jr. bluntly warns that
“since we do not know the definite human consequences of [video-conferencing]
technology, using immigrants as the guinea pigs of this trial technology distorts
our legal history and threatens our commitment to equal justice under the law.”92
We would be well advised, in my view, to heed this warning.
Even with greater study, it is important to acknowledge that there will
likely be significant unintended effects of transmitting evidence through video
conferencing. As Federman cautions, “[W]hile awareness … is the first step
in mitigating the unperceived influences of a medium’s [unintended] effects,
awareness alone is not sufficient to eliminate them; indeed it is unlikely in the
extreme that they can be eliminated from human cognition.”93 Stated more
simply, “[n]obody claims that ‘[v]ideo images are … adequate substitutes of live
interactions.”94 At least with the technology available today, it seems inevitable
that the tasks of assessing credibility and providing testimony will be experienced
differently when video-conferencing technology is used. Moreover, as Kathryn
Leader points out, “As long as jurors and legal practitioners believe the ideal
means to obtain the best evidence is ‘live’, [the use of video-conferencing] …
risks harming a witness’s credibility.95 In other words, for the time being, videoconferencing technology would seem to be an unavoidably non-neutral means of
delivering witness testimony.
Acknowledging this reality gives rise to questions about our ability to
assess witnesses’ evidence in general. It is helpful to keep in mind that concerns
relating to credibility assessments, in particular, are in large part rooted in
91. See e.g. discussions regarding the effects of the use of inferior equipment in Storck & Sproull,
supra note 72 at 199-200; Shari Seidman Diamond et al, supra note 65 at 898-899.
92. Eugenio Mollo, Jr, “The Expansion of Video Conferencing Technology in Immigration
Proceedings and Its Impact on Venue Provisions, Interpretation Rights, and the Mexican
Immigrant Community” (2006) 9:3 J Gender Race & Just 689 at 695.
93. Federman, supra note 61 at 436.
94. Roth, supra note 61 at 198.
95. Kathryn Leader, “Closed-Circuit Television Testimony: Liveness and Truth-telling” (2010)
14:1 Law Text Culture 312 at 327 [Leader, “Closed-Circuit Television Testimony”].
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assumptions about the value of demeanour evidence. That is, we care about how
video-conferencing technology affects our visual perceptions of witnesses because
we believe that demeanour tells us something important about their testimony.
The value of demeanour evidence has itself been seriously questioned, and an
evolving conversation is now taking place about the wisdom of its continued use.
Studies have revealed the perils of demeanour evidence, including, most starkly,
that even trained professionals “did no better than chance” in detecting deception
from demeanour.96 Moreover, judges have taken note of this peril and cautioned
against too much reliance on demeanour evidence in assessing the credibility of
witnesses.97 This broader questioning of the usefulness of demeanour evidence
has often been overlooked or treated cursorily in considerations of the use of videoconferencing technology. As observed by Kathryn Leader, “attempts to assess
what is problematic about … [video-conferenced testimony] fail also to query
what might be problematic about live testimony.”98
In order for further research into the effects of video-conferencing technology
on credibility assessments to be optimally useful, such research should directly
confront the value (or lack thereof ) of demeanour evidence more generally. If this
occurs, one potential result is that demeanour evidence will no longer be seen as
central to assessments of witness testimony. Although such a development would
diminish concerns in relation to how video-conferencing technology interacts
with our ability to assess demeanour, it would also introduce significant broader
consequences, including changes to well-established rules of evidence and appellate
96. Paul Ekman, Telling Lies: Clues to Deceit in the Marketplace, Politics, and Marriage (New
York: WW Norton and Company, 1992) at 285. See also, Natasha Bakht, “Objection, Your
Honour! Accommodating Niqab-Wearing Women in Courtrooms” in Grillo et al, eds, Legal
Practice and Cultural Diversity (London: Ashgate, 2008) 115 at 118-123 (discussing the perils
of relying on demeanour evidence).
97. See e.g. Cuthbert v TD Canada Trust, [2010] ONSC 830, OJ No 630 (QL) (per Karakatsanis
J, “courts have long recognized that demeanour can be misleading and is but one factor
in assessing credibility”). See also Canadian Judicial Council, Model Jury Instructions,
Preliminary Instructions at 4.11, online: Canadian Judicial Council <http://ww w.cjc-ccm.
gc.ca/cmslib/general/jury-instructions/NCJI%20Jury%20Instruction%20Preliminary%20
revised%20201 2-06%20E.pdf>. These model jury instructions advise the judge to ask the
jury:
What was the witness’s manner when he or she testified? Do not jump to conclusions, however,
based entirely on the witness’s manner. Looks can be deceiving. Giving evidence in a trial is not
a common experience for many witnesses. People react and appear differently. Witnesses come
from different backgrounds. They have different intellects, abilities, values, and life experiences. There are simply too many variables to make the manner in which a witness testifies the
only or the most important factor in your decision.

98. Leader, “Closed-Circuit Television Testimony,” supra note 95 at 324.
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standards of review where demeanour evidence plays a central role. As the
Ontario Court of Appeal observed in R v NS:
Appellate deference is justified to a significant extent on the accepted wisdom that
trial judges and juries have an advantage over appeal judges in assessing factual questions
because they, unlike appeal judges, have seen and heard the witnesses. Similarly,
the principled approach to the admission of hearsay evidence recognizes the value,
insofar as the assessment of reliability is concerned, in the trier of fact’s ability to
observe the witness’s demeanour as the witness made a statement which is proffered
as evidence of its truth.99

Seen in this light, the use of video conferencing to receive witness testimony
has potentially broad implications for the civil justice system. However, these
remain hidden in the absence of a serious and detailed consideration of how
video conferencing, as a mediating technology, affects how we relate to each other
in adjudicatory environments.

IV. CHANGING SPACE, CHANGING ADJUDICATION
In Part III, the analysis focused on how the act of transmitting evidence through
video-conferencing technology may affect witness testimony. In this Part, I shift
my focus and explore how the act of removing witnesses from the courtroom may
affect the adjudicatory process. More specifically, I consider the ways in which
video conferencing, by disrupting the geography of adjudication, may threaten
the solemnity associated with, and respect given to, the civil justice system. As
with the risks described in Part III, I argue that the risks described in this Part
require our attention as they implicate democratic values and raise fundamental
questions about the future of our adjudicatory processes.
A. VIDEO CONFERENCING AND THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE COURTROOM

Consideration of how the receipt of video-conferenced evidence might affect
the adjudicatory process generally begins and ends with a reference to “the
conventional rule”100 or “general principle”101 that witnesses give their evidence
99. R v NS, [2010] ONCA 670 at para 56, OJ No 4306 (QL). See also, Henry H Perritt, Jr,
“Video Depositions, Transcripts and Trials” (1994) 43:3 Emory L J 1071 at 1087-88, 109293 (describing how “[g]reater use of electronic formats can change the relationship between
trial and appellate courts” and how the introduction of video gives rise to a need to change
rules of civil procedure, rules of criminal procedure, rules of evidence and appellate rules)
[footnotes omitted].
100. Pack All, supra note 7 at para 9.
101. See Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 4.
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in person in the courtroom. This convention, of course, predates the existence of
video-conferencing technology and the possibility that a witness could provide
oral evidence in an interactive and immediate fashion from outside the courtroom.
In a number of respects, video-conferencing technology replicates features of viva
voce in-court testimony that have been deemed important: “A witness can see
and be seen … hear and be heard immediately … is still under oath and must
still account for his or her evidence … [and] must be in a designated place at a
specific time.”102 Given that this is the case, why be concerned about how video
conferencing affects adjudicatory practices? More specifically, “how much is the
live trial to do with bodies sharing the same space at the same time?”103
One useful starting point is to acknowledge that courts have been fundamentally
understood (and realized) in relation to bounded physical space for a very long time.
As Judy Radul writes, “[t]he court is bound to site.”104 Although the courtroom
may be a “relatively recent invention,” bounded adjudicative space is not. Courts
have a long history of being held in single, designated spaces imbued with special
meaning.105 The use of video-conferencing technology breaks with this history.
It is not simply that the physical environment of adjudication is changing,
for example, from under a tree to a brick courthouse. Video-conferencing
technology opens up the possibility of multiple, simultaneous, and interactive
sites of adjudication. This is something entirely new, bringing with it a new
set of challenges.
102. Leader, supra note 95 at 318.
103. Ibid.
104. Judy Radul, “What Was Behind Me Faces Me - Performance, Staging and Technology in the
Court of Law,” online: <http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2007-05-02-radul-en.html>.
105. Richard Mohr, “In Between Power and Procedure: Where the Court Meets the Public
Sphere” (1999) 1 J of Soc Change & Crit Inquiry, online: <http://pandora.nla.gov.au/npharch/2000/Z2000-Jan-24/http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/joscci/mohr.html>. As Mohr notes:
Dating back to Ancient Greece, courts have been held in special places. Homer described the
‘polished stones in a sacred circle’ which defined the place where the elders decided disputes.
In the twentieth century, it is still possible to consider courts as a sacred circle, though different
signs now distinguish them from the profane world outside. Robert Jacob has described the
evolution of the modern European court, from the place of justice signified by a tree and an
enclosure of hazel branches, to the timber panelling characteristic of more recent courtrooms.
Legal doctrine itself demands the court be fixed in place, from the Magna Carta’s dictum that
‘Ordinary lawsuits shall not follow the royal court around, but shall be held in a fixed place,’
to the modern requirement that courts sit at a ‘proclaimed place’.
...
Major tensions arise, in courthouse architecture and in law, between the place of the court and
the other places of which the court must take account: the sites of crimes or injuries, places
where witnesses are, and places accessible to the public.
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These challenges can be understood in a number of different ways. One
approach is to consider the legal geography at play and the relationship of bounded
adjudicative space to the adjudicatory process. In her work examining videoconferencing technology in the English context, Linda Mulcahy has thoughtfully
explored how the physical environment in which testimony is given “plays a critical
role in reinforcing the importance of the trial and the role of state-sanctioned
adjudication.”106 One manifestation of this role, as Mulcahy notes, can be seen
in “journeys to the trial.”107 That is, for courtroom participants the very act of
travelling to the courthouse to participate in proceedings can be transformative
due to the physical surroundings experienced during this journey. Visual cues
created by, for example, the distance that a court is set back from a busy street
or the design of the entrance to the courthouse can be used to “reinforce the
fact that going to court is not an ordinary or everyday occurrence.”108 Indeed, as
Mulcahy observes, official design guides for courts have taken note of this reality.
In these guides, general exhortations such as the proposition that “courthouses
must be planned and designed to frame, facilitate, and mediate the encounter
between the citizen and the justice system”109 can be found, as can more specific
guidance like the assertion that “the main entrance and entrance hall require a civic
presence to reflect the status of law in society and engender respect for decisions
made in the courts.”110 If witnesses no longer attend court but rather provide their
106. Linda Mulcahy, “The Unbearable Lightness of Being? Shifts Towards the Virtual Trial”
(2008) 35:4 J L & Soc’y 464 at 478-479 [Mulcahy, “Unbearable Lightness”]. See also, Linda
Mulcahy, Legal Architecture: Justice, Due Process and the Place of Law (New York: Routledge,
1997) [Mulcahy, Legal Architecture]. See also, Linda Mulcahy, “Architects of Justice: The
Politics of Courtroom Design” (2007) 16:3 Soc & L Stud 383.
107. Mulcahy, “Unbearable Lightness,” supra note 106 at 477-79.
108. Ibid at 477-78.
109. Judicial Conference of the United States, U.S. Courts Design Guide (2007) at 3-1 [US
Courts Design Guide]. This phrase appears within a longer description of design goals that
reads in part:
The architecture of federal courthouses must promote respect for the tradition and purpose
of the American judicial process. To this end, a courthouse facility must express solemnity,
integrity, rigor, and fairness. The facility must also provide a civic presence and contribute to
the architecture of the local community.
Courthouses must be planned and designed to frame, facilitate, and mediate the encounter
between the citizen and the justice system. All architectural elements must be proportional and
arranged hierarchically to signify orderliness. The materials employed must be consistently applied, be natural and regional in origin, be durable, and invoke a sense of permanence. Colors
should be subdued to complement the natural materials used in the design.

110. Mulcahy, “Unbearable Lightness,” supra note 106 at 478. Mulcahy notes the advice given
to architects in UK, Ministry of Justice, Court Standards and Design Guide (London: Her
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testimony remotely using video-conferencing technology, such visual cues will
be unseen and unheeded. The traditional relationship between court participants
and the geography and architecture of the court is disrupted. In this manner,
video-conferencing technology may be understood as potentially influencing the
cultural meaning associated with adjudicatory processes.
B. CONSIDERING SOLEMNITY

The idea that physical presence and the physical environment of the court room
are important is often connected to the concept of solemnity. A number of
authors have framed their concerns with video-conferencing technology in terms of
how “virtual trials threaten the solemnity of the courtroom.”111 Speaking from a
judicial perspective, former US District Court Judge Nancy Gertner has written about
the impact of video-conferenced testimony on the “gravitas” of the courtroom
and queried, “In the final analysis, should trials have the look and feel of the
television evening news?”112 Canadian courts have, to some extent, acknowledged
the potential for video-conferencing technology to disrupt the solemnity associated
with conventional trial practices. In R v Allen,113 Justice Duncan recognized the
objection that the “entire truth seeking process suffers by permitting the witness
to ‘mail it in’—to give evidence at a distance without his being brought into the
presence of those he is accusing and the solemn and majestic atmosphere of the
courthouse.”114 In discussing the principles to be applied when considering whether
a witness should be permitted to provide evidence in a criminal case through a
video link, Justice Gorman recently noted that “the Court must, in considering
Majesty’s Courts Service, 2010), an 830 page document providing detailed guidance on the
physical appearance and layout of Crown, county and magistrates’ courts in the UK:
The main entrance and entrance hall require a civic presence to reflect the status of Law in society and engender respect for decisions made in the courts. This can be achieved by being the
focus of the townscape, through symmetry and formality in the architecture, through a generous use of space and height internally and by the use of steps to the entrance … there should
also be a generous external gathering space outside the entrance. The main entrance should
symbolically be the image of the court, and the place outside which the Press photograph those
seeking publicity after a case.

111. See e.g. Sossin & Yetnikoff, supra note 56 at 262; Nancy Gertner “Videoconferencing:
Learning Through Screens” (2004) 12:3 Wm & Mary Bill Rts J 769 at 773.
112. Ibid at 784. Justice Gertner further observes:
We are used to looking at screens, in our bedrooms and living rooms, our offices, the train
station, in restaurants. The court, however, is different as seen with ‘the formality that attaches
to the ceremony, the robed judge, the witness’ oath, the public’s scrutiny, the creation of an
appellate record formed in a moment experienced simultaneously by all the parties.”

113. 2007 ONCJ 209, OJ No 1780 (QL).
114. Ibid at para 28.
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the location from which the evidence will be presented, consider whether the
witness will face the same level of solemnity offered by a courtroom.”115
Underlying the above comments is recognition of the deep role that
physical instantiations of ritual have historically played in relation to adjudicatory
processes. Although sites of adjudication have not always involved what we now
take as the paradigmatic adjudication location—bricks and mortar single-use
courthouses—“[w]here a chosen site for adjudication has no extraordinary
characteristics which mark it out as legal space it is often ritual rather than location
which render the proceedings significant.”116 Just as video-conferencing technology
alters the interaction that court participants have with the physical geography of
the courthouse, it also changes the nature of the court ritual—a ritual that has
traditionally relied on the presence of witnesses to imbue the court with meaning
and authority.
C. IMPLICATIONS OF THE VIRTUAL COURTHOUSE

As was the case with the risks to credibility assessments and emotional connectivity
identified in Part III, possible ways to manage risks to the solemnity of court
processes associated with taking witnesses out of the courtroom can be identified.
One seemingly straightforward measure would be to take steps to infuse the remote
location where the video-conferencing testimony is being given with some of the
gravitas that can typically be seen in physical courtrooms. A precedent can be
found in a video conferencing Practice Direction adopted by England in its civil
procedure rules. Among other things, the Practice Direction provides that “[w]hen
used for the taking of evidence, the objective should be to make the [videoconferencing] session as close as possible to the usual practice in a trial court where
evidence is taken in open court.”117 To this end, the Practice Direction specifies,
among other things, that “if the local site is not a courtroom, but a conference
room or a studio, the judge will need to determine who is to sit where,” and that
the “arranging party should make arrangements, if practicable, for the royal court
of arms to be placed above the judge’s seat.”118 Further, in cases involving public
trial proceedings, the arranging party must also ensure that the local site (if a studio
or conference room rather than a courtroom) “provides sufficient accommodation

115. R v Osmond, [2010] NJ No 54 at para 19 (QL), CanLII 6535 (Prov Ct).
116. Mulcahy, “Legal Architecture,” supra note 106 at 27.
117. The Civil Procedure Rules 1998, SI 1998/3132 (L 17) at PD 32, Annex 3, para 3 [The Civil
Procedure Rules].
118. Ibid at paras 12,14.
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to enable a reasonable number of members of the public to attend.”119 Regarding
the actual conduct of the hearing, the Practice Direction dictates that the judge
“will determine who is to control the cameras” and “decide whether court dress is
appropriate when using [video conferencing facilities].”120 Another example can
be found in the Practice Direction published by the District Court of Western
Australia regarding evidence taken via video link. Although the Australian Practice
Direction speaks in more general terms than the English Practice Direction, it
does specify that the party who intends to call a witness through video-conferencing
technology must “use reasonable endeavours to ensure that … [the witness is]
dressed appropriately for court, as if the witness was giving evidence in person in
the court room; [and that] the arrangements made with the venue from which
the video link or audio link is to be broadcast maintain the dignity and solemnity
of the court, consistent with the venue being treated as part of the court for this
purpose.”121 Even with these types of measures, however, it is readily apparent that
video-conferenced testimony takes place in a significantly different environment
than in-court testimony. Practice directions and protocols may mitigate some
of the differences but they cannot replicate all of the subtle effects of the geography
of the courthouse. Whether this is a good or a bad thing is not entirely straightforward.
On the one hand, there is good reason why we would want to engender
respect in adjudicatory processes. As the Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly
emphasized, public confidence in the justice system underwrites both the effective
administration of justice and the rule of law.122 From a more theoretical standpoint,
if public adjudication reflects and promotes democratic values, as is contended in
Resnik and Curtis’ account of adjudication as a democratic practice,123 the increasing
use of video-conferencing technology can be seen as a loss for democracy if it
diminishes public adjudication by disrupting the solemnity and gravitas of the
trial. Indeed, Mulcahy sees this particular risk in relation to video-conferencing
technology, writing:
More significant in the present context is the importance of physical presence itself.
It could be argued that the expectation that a person makes his or her accusation
in the presence of the accused in a setting designed for public functions speaks to
119. The Civil Procedure Rules, supra note 117 at para 13.
120. Ibid at paras 13, 19.
121. Chief Judge, District Court of Western Australia, Practice Direction GEN 1 of 2011 –
Video Link Evidence at 5.1(d), online: District Court of Western Australia <http://www.
districtcourt.wa.gov.au/_files/Practice%20Directio n%20GEN%201%20of%202011%20
Use%20of%20Video%20Link%20Facilities.pdf>.
122. Application Under s 83.28 of the Criminal Code, Re, 2004 SCC 42, 2 SCR 248.
123. See generally, Resnik & Curtis, supra note 81.
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a society that has an active public sphere and a sense of the collective. By way of
contrast, when evidence is transmitted from the home, workplace or hotel room it
suggest that the performance of civil duty in public has become an inconvenience.124

In other words, if we understand the “public processes of courts to contribute to
the functioning of democracies and give meaning to democratic aspirations”125 as
well as to underwrite the legitimacy of the legal system,126 we should be concerned
about trials potentially losing vitality and weight if and when court participants
no longer physically attend in court.
On the other hand, there are also a number of reasons why we might find the
disruption of traditional trial practices and conventional conceptions of the trial to
be a positive development. Design is far from benign when it comes to adjudicatory
spaces.127 As Henri Lefebvre observed, “[s]pace is not a scientific object removed
from ideology or politics; it has always been political or strategic.”128 In the case
of legal proceedings, notwithstanding the fact that courthouses and courtrooms
are often designed to “express solemnity, integrity, rigor, and fairness,”129 the
architecture of these spaces also often operates to reinforce unequal power
relations and marginalize vulnerable individuals and groups. Mulcahy provides a
crucial reminder on this issue in her work:
[T]he way space has been used in the courthouse has been fundamental to the
exercise of power by the privileged, ensuring a certain allocation of people in
space and a coding of their reciprocal relations. Studies of the architecture of
courts have, for instance, drawn attention to the ways in which the laity have
been marginalized in courtroom design and segregated from professionals for fear
of ‘contamination’. Others have drawn attention to the difficulties witnesses have in
appearing confident while describing intimate experiences to other across a large
intimidating courtroom … Seen in this way, the space in a courtroom becomes a
particular articulation of social, cultural, and legal relations in which some actors
are privileged and others disempowered.130
Mulcahy, “Unbearable Lightness,” supra note 106 at 484.
Resnik & Curtis, supra note 81 at 301.
Markovits, supra note 88 at 184-93.
See e.g. the discussion in Mulcahy “Unbearable Lightness,” supra note 106.
Henri Lefebvre “Reflections on the Politics of Space,” translated by Michael J Enders (1976)
8:2 Antipode 30 at 31. The work of Michel Foucault has, of course, also been tremendously
influential on the topic of the ideology of space. See e.g. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish:
the Birth of the Prison, translated by Alan Sheridan (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977).
129. US Courts Design Guide, supra note 109 at 3-1.
130. Mulcahy, “Unbearable Lightness,” supra note 106 at 480-81. On the issue of segregation,
David Tait has further observed, “[i]t can be argued that recent courthouses, with up to six
separate circulation systems, are some of the most segregated buildings in the modern world.
Judges, court staff, prisoners, protected witnesses, the public—and jurors—may have their
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
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Situated in these critiques, video conferencing cannot simply be seen as a
way in which witness testimony can be more easily and cheaply presented in
court. Rather, in removing witnesses from the courtroom, this technology has the
potential to disrupt the power relations that would otherwise be embedded in an
adjudicatory process where witnesses physically come to court.
For Aboriginal communities, in particular, the impact of altering the geography
of adjudication is complex. Speaking to the Australian context, Anne Wallace queries:
For Aboriginal people who may be more likely to feel intimidated or marginalized
in the physical courtroom, will the “virtual court” experience add or detract from
those feelings? Will the additional layer of “technology-mediated communication”
only add to the linguistic and cultural differences that can impede their effective
participation in the courtroom?
On the other hand, is it possible that for those Aboriginal witnesses, the distancing
effect, and perhaps a less formal approach, may assist their effective participation?131

Wallace further reports that discussions with Australian Aboriginal persons
as part of case studies into the use of video-conferencing technology revealed
“a clear preference for people to be able to remain within their community to
deal with legal matters, wherever possible” and that “[t]his is a product not
just of the difficulties and cost associated with arranging travel from remote
locations, but of the desire of Aboriginal people to remain on their own
country.”132 If Canadian Aboriginal communities share these preferences, this
provides a compelling reason to use video-conferencing technology in relation to
these communities. Exactly how these technologies might be best used in these
communities, however, would still remain an important question to be determined.
As Wallace points out, issues such as the location of facilities (e.g., will remote
witness rooms be located in police stations or community centres?) and levels of
on-site support are crucial, but are at risk of being given little thought.133
Outside the context of these particular communities, the risk that videoconferencing technology will disrupt the geography of adjudication leaves
lingering, but fundamental questions regarding what type of civil justice system
we wish to have and what values it will prioritize. As Winner observes:
own distinct network of entrances, staircases, elevators, bathrooms and waiting areas.” See
David Tait, “Democratic Spaces in a Citadel of Authority” (2009) 98:5 Architecture Australia
45 at 45.
131. Wallace, supra note 89 at 16.
132. Ibid at 21.
133. Ibid.
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As we “make things work,” [the important question about technology becomes]
what kind of world are we making? This suggests that we pay attention not only to
the making of physical instruments and processes, although that certainly remains
important, but also to the production of psychological, social, and political conditions
as part of any significant technical change.134

By taking witnesses outside the courtroom, video-conferencing technology
disrupts the geography of adjudication and threatens the solemnity associated
with, and respect given to, the civil justice system as it is conventionally understood
today. It also, however, carries with it a liberating potential to shape new court
process that are more responsive to and inclusive of the public. We need to confront
the potential transformative power of video-conferencing technology, with
respect to both the justice system and to society more broadly, rather than simply
continuing to treat it as a neutral tool at our disposal.

V. THE CASE FOR CAUTION REVISITED
Parts III and IV, above, explore potential consequences generated by, first, the
use of video conferencing as a mediating technology and, second, changes to
the geography of adjudication brought on by video conferencing. They establish
that, notwithstanding the advanced technology available today, significant risks
remain in relation to using this technology, including problems with credibility
assessments, with the emotional connections (or lack thereof ) fostered between
courtroom participants, and with the solemnity of our adjudicatory processes.
Moreover, when considered through these perspectives, possible broader political
and social implications as well as the transformative potential of this technology
are brought to the forefront.
The upshot, in my view, is two-fold. First, our conversations regarding the
use of video-conferencing technology need to be broadened and deepened beyond
the now-dominant focus on cost and efficiency to include discussions of the
considerations identified above. Until this happens, we ought to resist barrelling
ahead with more widespread use of video-conferencing technology in civil justice
systems. Second, once we more fully confront the possible impacts of videoconferencing technology, we must consider how we want to further incorporate
it into our civil justice systems, if at all. At the heart of this decision, it would
seem to me, are choices about our attitude towards risk, as well as fundamental
questions about our justice system and how it ought to adapt to meet our needs
and reflect our values.
134. Winner, “Technologies as Forms of Life,” supra note 43 at 112.
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To be sure, the questions raised are not easy and do not permit straightforward
answers. Further complicating the picture is the reality that the environment in
which these issues and values are to be considered is in the midst of significant
change. There is currently an aggressive move away from the full public trial
(complete with viva voce in person evidence) as the paradigmatic means of resolving
civil disputes, towards more tailored, flexible, and private means of resolving
disputes.135 The shifting ground of the civil justice system also needs to be integrated
into our evaluation of this technology.
Moreover, many of the terms used above—such as dignity, democracy, and
access to justice—are contestable and, indeed, contested. A discussion about
what these terms mean and how they are to be realized in our justice system
needs to be brought to the forefront of the conversation about video-conferencing
technology and the use of other courtroom technologies. Finally, given what is at
stake, this conversation needs to extend beyond the judiciary and policy makers
and to be situated within broader public discussion regarding the state of the civil
justice system. In the words of Andrew Feenburg, “The design of technology is …
an ontological decision fraught with political consequences. The exclusion of the
vast majority from participation in this decision is profoundly undemocratic.”136
In short, a deeper and broader conversation is required.

VI. CONCLUSION
Technology presents itself as a one-way street; we are likely to dismiss discontents about
its direction because we read them as growing out of nostalgia or a Luddite impulse or as
simply in vain. But when we ask what we “miss,” we may discover what we care about,
what we believe to be worth protecting. We prepare ourselves not necessarily to reject
technology but to shape it in ways that honor what we hold dear.137
- Sherry Turkle

The aim of this article is to reframe the conversation about the use of video
conferencing in civil trials in Ontario. As the analysis illuminates, there is good
reason to adopt the cautious approach to this issue that is evident in the current
judicial consideration of video-conferenced evidence. The adoption of video
conferencing raises both empirical and normative questions that require careful
135. See Julie MacFarlane, The New Lawyer: How Settlement is Transforming the Practice of
Law (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008); See also Herbert M Kritzer, “Disappearing Trials? A
Comparative Perspective” (2004) 1:3 J Empirical L Stud 735.
136. Feenberg, supra note 39 at 3.
137. Turkle, supra note 2 at 19.
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attention. I offer no final verdict on the use of this technology in our civil justice
system. Rather, I take the position that the failure to meaningfully engage with
its risks means that we are in danger of what Langdon Winner has termed
“technological somnambulism.”138 In taking witnesses outside the courtroom we
do much more than simply allow witnesses to avoid the cost and inconvenience
of having to travel to attend court. We need to wake up and engage with the
potential unintended and diffuse consequences of introducing this technology
into our courts. The operative issue, in my view, is not whether the new tools
available to us are good or bad but rather how we should use them, if at all,
in light of our values. Although the path forward remains to be determined,
it seems clear that we can no longer afford to be sleepwalking through these
important decisions.

138. Winner, “Technology as Forms of Life,” supra note 43 at 104.

